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Abstract
Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (Berge-Zhukovskii) is an alter-
nate solution concept in non-cooperative game theory that formalizes co-
operation in a noncooperative setting. In this paper the -Berge-Zhukovskii
equilibrium is introduced and characterized by using a generative relation. A
computational method for detecting -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium based on
evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithms is presented. Numerical
examples are used to illustrate the results obtained.
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1. Introduction
In non-cooperative game theory players make decisions independently
based on their own interests and different equilibrium concepts are used to
provide decision makers an overview over possible outcomes of the game.
The most popular equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium [19] - a game
situation from which no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. A
more general equilibrium concept based on the notion of equilibrium for a
partition with respect to a coalition was proposed by Berge [3]. Zhukovskii
[24] formalized a particularization of the general Berge equilibrium and in-
troduced it as an alternate solution concept that is complementary to Nash
and more suited for games where the Nash equilibrium has no practical value
(trust games [17], taxation games [7, 8]). In literature the equilibrium defined
by Zhukovskii is referred to as Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii
[14, 20] or simply the Berge equilibrium [7, 6]. In this paper we will refer to
it as the Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium (BZ).
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The Berge-Zhukovskii (BZ) equilibrium is a situation in which every
player’s strategy is stable against the deviations of all other players. Ex-
istence theorems and characterizations for BZ equilibrium can be found in
[1, 20, 2, 18] and [14]. A connection between the BZ and the Nash equilib-
rium of several two person games that provides also a method to find the
BZ in n-player games is presented in [6]. To the best of our knowledge the
first computational method aimed to directly detect the Berge-Zhukovskii
equilibrium is described in [12].
The -Nash equilibrium introduced by Radner [22] can be viewed as a
weakening of the strict rationality - in this case it is enough to be “near”
to the Nash equilibrium - or to approximate the Nash equilibrium. The
value of  can be interpreted in several ways: measuring an uncertainty
of selecting a strategy, measuring a supplementary cost of attending the
equilibrium strategy, or a perturbation of the players rationality [10].
The -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced in a similar manner.
The intuition behind is the same as in the case of the -Nash equilibrium:
the epsilon gives a perturbation to the players strategies.
A generative relation for a certain game equilibrium is a binary relation
defined on strategy profiles with the property that the set of strategy profiles
non-dominated with respect to that relation is identic with the set of that
equilibria of the game (non-dominated strategies are those for which there
does not exists ’better’ ones with respect to the generative relation).
A generative relation for describing -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is pro-
posed. The most important feature of this relation is that it can be used to
redirect the search of an evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithm
towards the -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria of the game.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: after a brief in-
troduction in non-cooperative games Section two, the Berge-Zhukovskii and
-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium are presented. Section three introduces the
generative relation used in the equilibrium detection method. Section four
gives a short introduction in multiobjective optimization. In Section five
numerical experiments are described. The paper ends with conclusions.
2. Berge-Zhukovskii and -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium
A finite strategic non-cooperative game can be formalized as a system
G = ((N,Si, ui), i = 1, ..., n),
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where:
• N represents a set of players, and n is the number of players;
• Si is the set of actions available to player i ∈ N ,
S = S1 × S2 × ...× Sn
is the set of all possible situations of the game, and s = (s1, ...sn) ∈ S
is a strategy (or strategy profile) of the game;
• for each player i ∈ N , ui : S → R represents the payoff function of
player i.
We will denote by S−i = S1×...×Si−1×Si+1×...×Sn, s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn)
and (s∗i , s−i) = (s1, s2, ..., s
∗
i , ..., sn).
The Berge equilibrium is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Berge equilibrium). Let M be a finite set of indices. De-
note by P = {Pt}, t ∈ M a partition of N and R = {Rt}, t ∈ M be a set
of subsets of N . A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an equilibrium strategy for the
partition P with respect to the set R, or simply a Berge equilibrium strategy,
if and only if the condition
upm(s
∗) ≥ upm(sRm , s∗N−Rm)
holds for each given m ∈M, any pm ∈ Pm and sRm ∈ SRm .
Remark 1. If P = {{i} : i ∈ N} and S = {{i} : i ∈ N} it is clear that the
Nash equilibrium is a Berge equilibrium for P relative to S, so every Nash
equilibrium is a Berge equilibrium. A Berge equilibrium which is also a Nash
equilibrium is called Nash-Berge equilibrium [1].
If we consider each class Pi of the partition P consists from a player i
and each set of Ri is the set N of players except i, we have M = N , Pi = {i}
and Ri = N − i, ∀i ∈ N, we obtain the Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium.
Playing in Berge-Zhukovskii sense means that each player wants to max-
imize the payoff of the other players. This equilibrium concept can be in-
terpreted as capturing cooperation in a non-cooperative game. Formally we
write:
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Table 1: The payoff functions of the two players in Prisoner’s Dilemma
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1 Cooperate (2, 2) (0, 3)
Defect (3, 0) (1, 1)
Definition 2 (Berge-Zhukovskii). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a Berge-
Zhukovskii equilibrium if the inequality
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(s∗i , s−i)
holds for each player i = 1, ..., n, and all s−i ∈ S−i.
The strategy s∗ is a Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium, if the payoff of each
player i does not decrease considering any deviation of the other N − {i}
players.
Example 1. Let us consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game presented in Ta-
ble 1.
The game has one pure Nash equilibrium (Defect, Defect), which does not
ensure the highest possible payoff for the two players. In contrary to this, the
Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium of the game is (Cooperate, Cooperate), which
may be a better solution for both players.
Inspired by the notion of -Nash equilibrium, the -Berge-Zhukovskii equi-
librium is introduced. The new equilibrium concept gives a flexibility to the
standard Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium.
The formal definition is the following:
Definition 3 (-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ ∈
S is an - Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium if the inequality
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(s∗i , s−i)− ,  > 0
holds for each player i = 1, ..., n, and sN−i ∈ S−i.
Remark 2. If  = 0 the -BZ is actually the Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium.
We denote by BZ the set of all - Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria of the
game.
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3. Generative relation for -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium
Generative relations [15] are used to characterize a certain equilibrium.
Furthermore, they may be used within optimization heuristics for fitness
assignment purposes in order to guide their search to the desired equilibrium
type.
The first generative relation was introduced for the Nash equilibrium
detection [15]. A generative relation for the detection of Berge-Zhukovskii
equilibrium is introduced in [12].
Consider two strategy profiles s and q from S. Denote by b(s, q) the
number of players who lose (with a deviation of ) by remaining to the initial
strategy s, while the other players are switching their strategies to q if they
are all different from s.
We may express b(s, q) as:
b(s, q) = card{i ∈ N, ui(s) < ui(si, q−i) + , s−i}q−i},
where card{M} denotes the cardinality of the set M and s−i}q−i ⇐⇒
sj 6= qj for all j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i.
The intuition behind the construction of b is that, in the search form
-BZ we try to minimize the number of players whose payoff would increase
when all the others switch to other strategies. Two strategy profiles may be
compared by using the following relation:
Definition 4. Let s, q ∈ S. We say the strategy s is better than strategy q
(s dominates q) with respect to -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium, and we write
s ≺B q, if and only if the inequality
b(s, q) < b(q, s)
holds, i.e. there are less players that would benefit when all the others change
their strategies from s to q than from q to s.
Remark 3. If b(s, q) = b(q, s) then we consider s and q to be indifferent
to each other with respect to the ≺B relation .
Definition 5. The strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an -Berge-Zhukovskii non-do-
minated strategy (BZN), if and only if there is no strategy s ∈ S, s 6= s∗
such that s dominates s∗ with respect to ≺B i.e.
s ≺B s∗.
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We may consider relation ≺B as a candidate for generative relation of
the -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium. What we need to prove is that the set
of the non-dominated strategies with respect to the relation ≺B equals the
set of -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria of the game. In this case, ≺B could be
used to compare strategy profiles and guide the search of heuristics such as
evolutionary algorithms towards the -BZ equilibria.
Proposition 1. If a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an - Berge-Zhukovskii equi-
librium then the inequality
b(s
∗, s) = 0
holds, for all s ∈ S.
Proof 1. Let s∗ ∈ BZ. Suppose there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S, such
that b(s
∗, s) = w, w > 0. Therefore there exists i ∈ N , such that
ui(s
∗, s−i) +  > ui(s
∗).
This contradicts the definition of the - Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium. Hence
b(s
∗, s) = 0.
Proposition 2. All -BE equilibrium strategies are -Berge-Zhukovskii non-
dominated strategies, i.e.
BZ ⊆ BZN.
Proof 2. Let s∗ ∈ BZ. Suppose s∗ is dominated. Therefore there exists a
strategy profile s ∈ S dominating s∗:
s ≺B s∗.
From definition of the relation ≺B we have
b(s, s
∗) < b(s∗, s).
As s∗ is an -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium from Prop. 1 it follows that
b(s
∗, s) = 0.
Thus we have
b(s, s
∗) < 0.
But this is not possible, because b(s, s
∗) denotes the cardinality of a set.
Therefore s∗ is from BZN (i.e. non-dominated).
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Proposition 3. All -Berge-Zhukovskii non-dominated strategies are -BZ
equilibrium strategies, i.e.
BZN ⊆ BZ.
Proof 3. Let us consider s∗ ∈ BZN (s∗ is a non-dominated strategy profile)
and suppose that s∗ 6∈ BZ.
If s∗ 6∈ BZ ⇒ ∃s−i such that
ui(s
∗) < ui(s∗, s−i) + , (1)
and s∗−i}s−i.
Let us denote by q the strategy profile (s∗, s−i).
We have:
b(s
∗, q) = card{j ∈ N, uj(s∗) < uj(s∗j , q−j) + , s∗−j}q−j}.
But for all j 6= i we have s∗i = qi so s∗−j}q−j does not hold, and for j = i
relation (1) holds, therefore b(s
∗, q) = 1.
On the other hand
b(q, s
∗) = card{j ∈ N, uj(q) < uj(qj, s∗−j) + , q−j}s∗−j}.
If i 6= j s∗i = qi so q−j}s∗−j does not hold.
If i = j we have (qi, s
∗
−i) = s
∗, therefore ui(q) < ui(qi, s∗−i), if and only if
ui(q) < ui(s
∗) + 
if
ui(s
∗, s−i) < ui(s∗) + 
which would contradict relation (1). Therefore b(q, s
∗) = 0.
We have that b(s
∗, q) > b(q, s∗), which contradicts the assumption of
non-domination, therefore s∗ is an -BZ equilibrium.
Proposition 4. All -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria are -Berge-Zhukovskii non-
dominated strategies and all -Berge-Zhukovskii non-dominated strategies are
-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria:
BZ = BNS.
Proof 4. Directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
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4. Evolutionary detection method
Solving a multiplayer game in which players seek to maximize their payoffs
has many common features with the Multiobjective Optimization Problem
(MOP). In both cases the goal is to maximize the payoffs/objective functions.
For a MOP the m objectives are represented by a set {ui}i∈{1,...,m} of
functions where ui : S → R maps a solution s from the decision space
S ⊆ Rn to the objective space R. F : S → Rm represents the objective
vector that needs to be maximized F (s) = (u1(s), u2(s), ..., um(s)).
Usually the ideal solution vector s that optimizes simultaneously all ob-
jective functions does not exist. When solving a multiobjective problem
usually one does not find a single solution that best approximate F but a set
of solutions that approximate the Pareto optimal set. The Pareto optimal set
is formed by the Pareto non-dominated solutions which represent the best
trade-offs among the m objectives. Thus two solutions are compared using
the Pareto dominance relation: for any two decision vectors s, s′ ∈ S we say
that s is better than s′ or s dominates s′, if ui(s) ≥ ui(s′)∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} and
∃j ∈ {1, ...,m} such that uj(s) > uj(s′).
Evolutionary Multiobjective Algorithms have been successfully used for
solving such problems [5], [23]. As they are population based metaheuristics
they represent a good choice because by evolving a set of possible solutions
(the population) a good approximation of the Pareto front can be found in
a single run while the shape, continuity or other mathematical properties of
the true front do not hinder the search.
The task of the optimization algorithm is to find a good approximation
of the Pareto optimal set while maintaining a good diversity in the popula-
tion. In Pareto based multiobjective optimization algorithms the search is
driven by the Pareto dominance relation: if a new generated solution Pareto
dominates a solution from the current population it replaces it in the next
population.
For detecting the -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium any Pareto based multi-
objective algorithm is suitable. The only modification needed is the replace-
ment of the Pareto dominance relation whenever it is used during the search
with the relation ≺B .
5. Numerical experiments
The computation of -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria is illustrated for two
examples of games with two and three players. These games correspond to
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a multiple objective optimization problem where the problem objectives are
represented by the payoff of each player but searching for a different solution
concept.
For detecting  -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria a modified version of the
Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II ) [9] algorithm is con-
sidered. NSGA-II is an evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithm
based on the Pareto dominance. The NSGA-II algorithm is modified by
replacing the Pareto dominance procedure with the generative relation ≺B .
A new version of the NSGA-II method for -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium
detection called BZ-NSGA-II is obtained.
For all the tests a population of 150 individuals is used for 150 generations
of the BZ-NSGA-II. As for the variation operators we use a distribution
indexes for mutation and crossover ηm = 20 and ηc = 20.
The obtained results are illustrated in the following manner: for two
or three players the payoffs space is represented by assigning axes to the
payoff of each player and representing solutions as points in the two and
three dimensional spaces respectively. In each graphic the set of -BZ is
represented with gray color.
5.1. Experiment 1
Let us consider the two-person continuous game G1 [21], having the fol-
lowing payoff functions:
u1(s1, s2) = −s21 − s1 + s2,
u2(s1, s2) = 2s
2
1 + 3s1 − s22 − 3s2,
si ∈ [−2, 1], i = 1, 2.
The Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium of the game is (1, 1) with the corre-
sponding payoffs (−1, 1). Figures 1-4 present the detected -Berge-Zhukovskii
equilibria for  ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.9}.
5.2. Experiment 2 - Voluntary contribution mechanism
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM ) is a good example illus-
trating that people are not totally self-interested. They spend time making
something for the common good. Theoretical studies [4] and experiments
[11, 16] are made concerning player behavior. A model of the VCM is de-
scribed as game G2:
ui(s) = 10− si + 0.4
∑
i=1,n
si, si ∈ [0, 10], i = 1, ..., n.
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Figure 1: G1,  = 0.1. Theoretical -BZ
are represented in gray. Detected solutions
cover the theoretical front efficiently
Figure 2: G1,  = 0.2. Increasing the value
of  leads to a larger set of -BZ which is
covered by the detected solutions.
Figure 3: G1,  = 0.5. Increasing  enlarges
the set of equilibria, but it is still well cov-
ered by detected solutions.
Figure 4: G1,  = 0.9. Even for  = 0.9
BZ −NSGA− II is capable to compute a
reasonable set of -BZ solutions.
In this game the Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is achieved when all players
play strategy 10, which means they spend all for the public good. Detected
-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria for the two-player version of the VCM game
are presented in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8. Results obtained for the three player
version of the game are depicted in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Discussion. Numerical experiments presented here illustrates that BZ-NSGA-
II technique is able to find a good approximation of the -Berge-Zhukovskii
set for different values of  and for different number of players.
As it is natural to expect, by increasing the value of  the number of -
Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria also increases by covering a region (whose shape
depends on the payoff function) in the payoffs space that includes the Berge-
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Figure 5: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism, evolutionary detected solutions for
 = 0.1.
Figure 6: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism, evolutionary detected solutions for
 = 0.2.
Figure 7: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism, evolutionary detected solutions for
 = 0.5.
Figure 8: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism, evolutionary detected solutions for
 = 0.9.
Zhukovskii equilibrium. In fact, for  = 0 the Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium
is obtained.
6. Conclusion
Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is a powerful concept specially in trust
games. The -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium represents a flexible concept that
approximates the BZ equilibrium. It may be also considered as a relaxation
of the BZ equilibrium. The -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced in
this paper. A generative relation characterizing the set of -Berge-Zhukovskii
equilibria is also proposed.
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Figure 9: Voluntary Contribution Mecha-
nism and evolutionary detected solutions
for  = 0.1.
Figure 10: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism and evolutionary detected solutions
for  = 0.2.
Figure 11: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism and evolutionary detected solutions
for  = 0.5.
Figure 12: Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism and evolutionary detected solutions
for  = 0.9.
Apart defining the equilibrium concept, a computational method to ap-
proach these equilibria is presented. Based on the idea that the equilibrium
search and the multi-objective optimization can be considered in the same
class of problems, an evolutionary algorithm for multiobjective optimiza-
tion is adapted for -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibria detection. Numerical ex-
periments validate the proposed method and confirm the theoretical results
presented.
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